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Reflections on the Study of Buddhism
Notes on the Approaches 
of Ui Hakuju and D. T. Suzuki
Ueda Yoshifumi
Buddhist tradition is taken as an object of study in a number of 
academic fields, including history, anthropology, psychology, philos­
ophy, art, sociology, religion and literature, but surely these can­
not all be viewed as disciplines directed to probing its essential nature. 
If there is indeed a discipline that may be called Buddhist studies in this 
sense—not merely because it takes Buddhist tradition as an object— 
then there must be a methodology that distinguishes it from other fields 
treating Buddhism.
The predominant methodology in modern Indian Buddhist studies is 
philological. It is not the only approach being applied, but it may be 
said that focus on literary remains and research through the study of 
texts forms the mainstream of Buddhist scholarship both in Japan and 
elsewhere. Such study is, of course, an important tool, but I wonder if 
greater reflection on its limitations as a means of illuminating the core 
of Buddhism is not necessary.
The fundamental problem inherent in such an approach may be seen 
by examining the prefatory verse to MQlamadhyamakakQrikO:
I pay homage to the perfectly enlightened one—the Buddha, 
who is supreme among teachers of the dharma—who has 
taught co-dependent origination characterized by no ceasing,
* This is a translation of “Ui Hakuju to Suzuki Daisetz,” which appeared in Suzuki 
Daisetz zenshQ geppV 21 (June 1982), pp. 1-5, and 22 (July 1982), pp. 1-10. Readers 
are also referred to “BukkyOgaku no hohOron ni tsuite,” in Daijo bukkyO no shiso 
(Tokyo, 1977), pp. 63-86.
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no arising, no discontinuance, no permanence, no oneness, 
no manyness, no coming, and no departing, in which all 
discriminative discourse is quiescent, and which is blissful.
The central concept of MQlanuidhyamakakarika is emptiness (tiinyata) 
or co-dependent origination (prantyasamutpada) (these two terms are 
said to be synonymous). This verse states that co-dependent origina­
tion is characterized by the extinction of all discriminative discourse 
(prapanca), all verbal expression based on false discrimination. 
Similarly, it is later stated that in emptiness, all discriminative 
discourse dies way (Chapter 18, verse 5). In Candrakirti’s commen­
tary, this discriminative discourse is taken to indicate simply “words” 
(vac). If this is the case, however, then emptiness or co-dependent 
origination cannot be explained in words. The question therefore 
arises, for Buddhist scholarship, how a philological method, which 
deals with words, can illuminate what cannot be verbally expressed.
Looking again to the prefatory verse, however, we must consider 
the phrase, “the perfectly enlightened one—the Buddha, who is 
supreme among teachers of the dharma—who has taught 
(desayamdsa) co-dependent origination ... in which all discriminative 
discourse is quiescent.” Here, the words of the Buddha are spoken of 
as teaching (desana). Co-dependent origination, which is inexplicable, 
nevertheless can be taught through the words termed desana. The ques­
tion concerning methodology, then, is whether the words dealt with in 
philological study are prapanca or desana. If they are prapanca, then 
they may be amenable to a philological approach, but they are totally 
useless for leading to a grasp of emptiness or co-dependent origination. 
If they are desana, then the question arises whether scholarly training 
can enable one to deal with them even though one is not enlightened. It 
is widely assumed that if we think along the lines indicated by Buddhist 
texts, our thoughts and expressions will naturally be desana. But it is 
because the Buddha is enlightened that he can preach desana. How is it 
possible for us, in our research, to select our words so that they are free 
of prapanca and become defana? Must not such a consideration form 
part of our methodological self-awareness if we are to have a field of 
research that may genuinely be called “Buddhist studies”?
If research in Buddhism is to advance not merely in quantity—in the 
number of texts taken into the domain of linguistic study—but 
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qualitatively also, new approaches must be formulated. It is impossible 
to outline such an approach here, but as one step toward such effort, I 
would like reflect on the limitations of a strictly philological method, 
and on the danger of inadvertently overstepping those limitations, by 
comparing the approaches to several basic concepts of two modern 
Japanese figures, Ui Hakuju and D. T. Suzuki.
Suzuki’s work is of course well known and widely read, but his in­
fluence on methods of academic Buddhist studies has not been great, 
and the depth and originality of his contribution to our knowledge of 
Buddhism is not as well recognized as it should be. As a scholar, Ui’s 
position is much more firmly established. He was one of the pioneers of 
modern Buddhist studies in Japan, and his monumental research in 
Buddhist thought, based on meticulous textual study, continues to 
wield a dominating influence. In such research, however, there is a 
tendency to assume that Buddhism is fully open to exploration through 
these methods. Thus, there is a constant danger of falling into error by 
attempting to grasp through a philological methodology what lies 
beyond its limits. Below, I will consider several examples.
Subjectivity-only as Discrimination of Nondiscrimination
The understanding of the term “subjectivity-only” (vijnaptimatrata) 
is a central problem in the study of Yogacara Buddhism.1 Subjectivity 
(yijnapti) basically signifies all mental activity of perception, thought 
and feeling—the seeing subject that knows by discriminating objects. 
Through practice, the bodhisattva eliminates discrimination and 
realizes suchness or true reality, which is free of the subject-object 
dichotomy. The suchness that is attained, however, is termed subjectiv­
ity-only. Why should the realization that the bodhisattva attains 
through the elimination of the discriminating subject be called “subjec­
tivity-only”? In his study of MahayQnasamgraha, Ui comments on this
1 The Yogicira term vijAapti holds two opposing meanings. Fundamentally, it is 
synonymous with vijAlina, the knowing (jllnAti) of things by division (vz-) into subject 
and object. At the beginning of Vimfatika, Vasubandhu states that citta, manas, 
vijnUna, and vijAapti are all synonyms. That is, they all indicate the active knower. 
Thus, the Chinese translation of vijiiapti is almost always the same as that of vijAana: 
shih tk (to know).
In addition, when used together with pratibhosa (ObhOsa, etc.), “to appear as,’’ 
vijAapti implies that which is known. Without losing the significance it shares with 
vijAana (what perceives and knows), it is said to appear as form (rQpa}, etc.
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problem:
What is it like when one has reached the true and real subjec­
tivity-only in which both object and subject are
eradicated? In ParamSrtha’s exposition, it is called 
“undefiled subjectivity, the mind pure in its nature”; the term 
for it includes the word “subjectivity.” Since he has 
employed “subjectivity” in such compounds as “subject­
ivity-only with no object” and “subjectivity-only as means,” 
he adopts the term here also. Strictly speaking, however, the 
term “subjectivity” should have been abandoned. (Shddai- 
jOron kenkyQ, p. 72)
In the stage of “subjectivity-only as means,” all objects have been 
made empty but the perceiving subject has not; it is therefore 
understandable that this stage should be called “subjectivity-only with 
no object.” In the stage of “true and real subjectivity-only,” however, 
both subject and object are made empty and abandoned. The question 
arises, then, why it should be labeled “subjectivity,” as in “undefiled 
subjectivity.” Why even the term “true and real subjectivity-only” to 
indicate a state in which the perceiving subject has already been 
eradicated? Ui reasons that because the term “subjectivity” has been 
used up to this point, it continues to be employed. This, however, is 
not persuasive. If “subjectivity-only as means” is an appropriate term 
for the stage in which there is a perceiving subject but no object, then 
when there is neither subject nor object—when the subject-object 
dichotomy has been eradicated—it would be natural not to use “subjec­
tivity.” Why is a term that should, “strictly speaking,” be abandoned 
still used? Unless this is explained, Ui’s interpretation is inadequate.
Ui’s understanding of the use of the term “subjectivity” in 
subjectivity-only is representative of the interpretation that dominates 
the world of Indian and Buddhist studies in Japan at present. Accor­
ding to this understanding, “subjectivity” in such compounds as 
“undefiled subjectivity,” “true and real subjectivity-only,” and “pure 
subjectivity” is a misnomer. Ui states:
In the case of the eradication of object and subject as “true 
and real subjectivity-only” the term “mind” [as in “Buddha- 
mind”] should be used; it should certainly not be called “sub-
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jectivity.” (ShOdaijdron kenkyU, p. 72)
From the stance of philological research, however, once one has ascer­
tained that the term “subjectivity” appears in the texts, one must inter­
pret its meaning. To claim, because its usage does not agree with one’s 
own interpretation, that it should not have been used and to try to do 
away with it, must surely be called a violation of one’s own 
methodology.
The question that Ui raises is not simply a problem of Paramartha’s 
translations. In Trimtika verses 25 and 26 and Sthiramati’s commen- 
tary, subjectivity-only is identified with thusness of mind (cittadhar- 
mata), suchness, and the nonexistence of both grasped object and 
grasping mind. If one takes Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Paramftrtha 
literally, in nondiscriminative wisdom, suchness, or thusness, that 
there is no subjectivity and that there is only subjectivity are both 
established simultaneously. The intellect that works in philological 
research, however, cannot accept this self-contradiction, and ways to 
overcome or neutralize it are sought. Ui’s explanation quoted above 
was born in this way, and it must be said to be an error arising from 
failure to recognize the limits of philological methods. Unless we have 
methods by which we can grasp the inherent self-contradiction in non­
discriminative wisdom or suchness, not by rationalizing or effacing it, 
but as it is, we will not be able to understand the Buddhist texts.
Suzuki offers a viable alternative interpretation. He explains, concer­
ning Treatise on No-Mind (Mushinron) attributed to Bodhidharma, 
“Precisely because it is no-mind, it is able to see, hear, think, and 
know.”2 This is diametrically opposed to Ui’s understanding quoted 
above. To perceive or know is for the perceiving subject (i.e., grasping, 
upalabdhi) to be functioning; thus, according to Ui, if there is seeing or 
knowing, then there is subjectivity (mental activity), not no-mind. 
However, nondiscriminative wisdom or suchness in which there is 
neither subject nor object is in fact called subjectivity-only; this means 
that subjectivity (false discrimination) has been transformed into non­
discriminative wisdom and that in this wisdom (Vasubandhu calls it 
“no-mind”),3 there is subjectivity (seeing, hearing, thinking, knowing). 
This corresponds to the thought of Treatise on No-mind as explained 
2 Zen shisOshi kenkyQ, in Suzuki Daisetz zenshQ (Tokyo, 1982), vol. II, p. 230.
’ Acitta, in Trimfikd verse 29.
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by Suzuki. “No-mind” here does not mean simply that there is no men­
tal activity, but indicates the nonduality of nonexistence of mind (both 
object and mind are eradicated) and its existence (seeing, hearing, 
thinking, knowing). This is expressed in the Treatise, “Where should 
there be no-mind apart from seeing, hearing, thinking and knowing?” 
Thus, Suzuki explains no-mind as the “mind of no-mind” and 
“discrimination of nondiscrimination,” indicating the simultaneous 
establishment as a single whole of absence of discriminative perceiving 
and knowing (no-mind) together with perceiving and knowing.
Subjectivity-only as used by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati has, in its 
ontological aspect, this same meaning. “Only” implies the nonex­
istence of objects and also of the subject. On the one hand, it means 
that a thing known or perceived is not known as it is; though seen as an 
existing object, it does not really exist. The seer that stands opposite 
the object in the relationship of knowing is designated false discrimina­
tion (vikalpa), for it takes an object that does not exist as existing. This 
nonexisting object is discriminated nature (parikalpita-svabhava). The 
seer itself exists, for it is other-dependent nature (paratantra- 
svabhOva), meaning that it arises from causes and conditions.4 Since 
the object does not actually exist, there is only the seer.
4 Trimfika verse 21.
5 Sthiramati’s commentary on TrimJika verse 22.
On the other hand, however, if there is no object grasped, neither 
can there be a subject that grasps. This is expressed, “Through 
[grasped objects being] discriminated nature (i.e., nonexistent), other- 
dependent nature (subjectivity) is empty.”5 Subjectivity, then, exists, 
for it arises through causes and conditions, and at the same time it is 
empty or nonexistent through the nonexistence of its object. This emp­
tiness differs from the nonexistence of perceived objects in relation to 
the existence of the subject. The emptiness of the subject embraces 
other-dependent nature (existence of subjectivity or vikalpa) itself, so 
there is no existence that stands relative to it. This nothingness or non- 
being (abhova) signifies the emptiness of all dharmas taught in the 
Prajfiaparamita Sutras; it is absolute nothingness, and is termed 
fulfilled nature (parinispanna-svabhOva).
Thus, the “subjectivity” of subjectivity-only affirms the existence of 
the perceiving subject precisely where subject and object have been 
eradicated. With both subjectivity-only and no-mind, where there is no 
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mind or discriminative thinking, there is mind, and this mind 
(discrimination) is always thoroughly pervaded by the nonexistence of 
mind (nondiscrimination). Maitreya’s Madhyantavibhaga states:
It is established that grasping (upalabdhi, i.e., subjectivity) 
has the self-nature of no-grasping (nopalabdhi, no-subjec­
tivity). No-grasping and grasping are therefore the same. 
(I, 7)
Here, existence and nonexistence or affirmation and negation are iden­
tified.
We see, then, that in subjectivity-only, the three natures discussed 
in YogScSra are all included. The nonexistent object is termed 
discriminated nature, and the existence of the subject is other-depend­
ent nature. Further, through the nonexistence termed discriminated 
nature, other-dependent nature is also empty. The emptiness in which 
discriminated nature and other-dependent nature are one is fulfilled 
nature.6 Other-dependent nature (subjectivity) and fulfilled nature 
(emptiness) are therefore both different and nondifferent.
6 Trim^ika verse 22.
7 Trimsikd verse 25.
8 Sthiramati’s commentary on Trirrrfika verse 25.
Fulfilled nature is thusness (tathata), the object of supreme wisdom 
(paramartha). Since supreme wisdom is nondiscriminative, it is always 
nondual with its object; hence, fulfilled nature indicates both thusness 
or suchness (the seen) and nondiscriminative wisdom (the seer). The ex­
pression “subjectivity-only” does not include a term indicating 
wisdom such as jnana or prajfia, but since it signifies suchness7 and is 
nondifferent from fulfilled nature, it must be seen to indicate non­
discriminative wisdom also.
Since subjectivity-only is a term for the wisdom or suchness realized 
by the bodhisattva, its two aspects of existence and nonexistence reflect 
the fundamental nondualistic structure of reality in Mahayana 
thought. Other-dependent nature is the essence (atmaka) of all things, 
which arise from causes and conditions and are thus karma-created 
(samskrta) and existent. Fulfilled nature is the thusness of all things8 
and, as we have seen, has the nature of absolute nothingness. Since 
other-dependent and fulfilled nature are both different and non­
different, the relationship of all things (dharma) and thusness (dhar-
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mats) is also one of both difference and nondi(Terence. This is also the 
relationship of the karma-created and the uncreated. In subjectivity-on­
ly, the “subjectivity” is karma-created, and “only” points to the 
nonexistence of subjectivity implied by the nonexistence of objects, 
that is, to fulfilled nature or the uncreated.
Subjectivity-Only With No Object
The basic structure of subjectivity-only also has an epistemological 
aspect. That other-dependent nature (karma-created) and fulfilled 
nature (uncreated) are both different and nondifferent means that sub­
jectivity and no-subjectivity or nondiscrimination (gvijnapti) are also 
so related. Subjectivity-only refers to discriminative thought and 
perception that occurs without departing from nondiscrimination (non­
duality of wisdom and object); this is the discrimination of non­
discrimination. In the thought of Asariga and Vasubandhu as seen in 
MahOyQnasarpgraha and TrimsikQ, subjectivity refers basically to the 
seer in contrast to the seen. Hence, “subjectivity-only” is seeing and 
knowing without any object. This is subjectivity where both subject 
and object have been eradicated; it is, as we have seen above, both non- 
discriminative wisdom and suchness.
Perception without any object, however, presents a paradox that can­
not be dealt with through a philological methodology; hence, subjec­
tivity-only cannot be understood literally, and it comes to be 
understood conceptually. Throughout most of the history of Yogac£ra 
thought in China and Japan, it has been interpreted to mean that 
things regarded as existing objectively, independent of the subject, ac­
tually exist only within the subjectivity. In this interpretation, 
Yogacara thought is clearly a kind of idealism. Further, DharmapSla’s 
commentary on TrimsikQ9 provides a basis for just such an understan­
ding in its concept of the “evolving of subjectivity” into seeing and 
seen parts. A close reading of Trirnsika and MahQyOnasamgraha, 
however, shows that subjectivity-only means not that subjectivity 
evolves a seen-part but rather that it is the perceiving subject without 
any object that is seen. Discriminated nature (nonexistent object) and 
other-dependent nature (perceiving subject) therefore stand in an on­
tological relationship of nonexistence and existence, and also in the
9 Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun as translated by Hsuan-tsang.
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epistemological relationship of object and subject. When object and 
subject are brought into these relationships, subjectivity-only is attain­
ed. This is the meaning of subjectivity-only in Asanga, Vasubandhu, 
Sthiramati, and Paramirtha.
Earlier we were confronted with the self-contradiction that in no­
mind (the eradication of both subject and object) there is perceiving 
and knowing. Here, in the concept of subjectivity without any object, 
the intellect is again blocked by something alien to our world of ex­
perience, but this is the literal explanation of subjectivity-only in 
Mahayanasamgraha and Trimsika. These two self-contradictions are 
two faces of nondiscriminative wisdom, or suchness, or subjectivity- 
only. Suzuki explains the aspect of seeing and knowing in no-mind as 
“mind of no-mind” or “discrimination of nondiscrimination.” How 
does he treat the aspect of subjectivity without any object?
Suzuki poured a great deal of thought into finding an English 
equivalent for prajnd, which is another term for nondiscriminative 
wisdom, and devised the compound “prajnS-intuition.” Late in life, 
however, he came to feel that there was a sharp distinction between pra- 
jn& and intuition:
In intuition, there is still an object, but satori is self-realiza­
tion without any object. In other words, it is unmediated; it is 
perception by the whole that is established where subject and 
object are not yet divided. PrajfiS-philosophy states “Form is 
emptiness, emptiness is form.” It is perception characterized 
by self-identity that arises from within form itself, or from 
within emptiness itself. It is not ordinary perception. It is not 
a perception limited to one faculty like vision or hearing, not 
perception with subject and object, or mediation. (TOyO no 
kokoroy p. 94)
Suzuki deeply probed prajnapiramita and Hua-yen thought, but in the 
area of YogScira, he seems to have been familiar chiefly with A waken­
ing of Faith and the Lankavatara Satra, and not to have read such 
writings as Mahayanasamgraha. Thus, he seems to have been unac­
quainted with the meaning of the term subjectivity-only outlined 
above. Further, this structure of subjectivity-only had not yet been 
discussed in scholarly studies. Thus, the expression “Satori (prajha) is 
self-realization without any object” was not derived from Buddhist 
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texts or secondary sources, nor can it be traced to Zen literature. It was 
probably a spark born from the contact of Suzuki, who had deeply ex­
perienced satori, with western Europe.
According to Suzuki, satori, prajha, or nondiscriminative wisdom is 
self-realization without any object, and perception by the whole. 
“Whole” (zentaisei) includes subject and object. Since it is the percep­
tion that arises from this whole, it is not a bifurcating mode of percep­
tion like vision or hearing; “subject and object are not yet divided.” 
To borrow the YogScSra expression, “seen and seer are same, same.” 
“Same” is used twice here: on the one hand, the wisdom that sees is 
nondiscriminative and does not differentiate among dharmas, for it 
does not stand in dualistic opposition to objects. On the other hand, 
the suchness that is the seen, the object, is nondiscriminated, and there 
is no discrimination as dharmas. Nondiscriminative wisdom is the sub­
ject and suchness is the seen, but they are the “same,” that is, “not yet 
divided” into seer and seen. Suzuki calls this “perception.” It is not 
our usual perception, but direct knowing, without any mediation of 
thought or word. It is also “self-realization” (jikaku), meaning that 
since wisdom and object are not divided as subject and object, for 
wisdom to know an object is none other than for wisdom to know 
itself. “Wisdom without any object” means that this wisdom does not 
grasp by objectifying in any way. When, for example, wisdom sees a 
form (rUpa)9 in that form wisdom is “subject and object not yet 
divided,” and seer and seen are the same; hence, “seeing” has the 
character of “self-identity.”
Because of this “self-identity,” in Yog£c£ra thought, subjectivity 
(vijfiapti) is used to signify both the seer and the seen. As the seen, it is 
“subjectivity that has appeared as form, etc.” (rupa-tidi-pratibhOsa vi- 
jfiapti). This seen is not simply an object, but simultaneously is itself 
subject or seer. However, since seer and seen stand as opposite poles in 
the relationship of perceiving and knowing, it is impossible for one to 
be the other at the same time. Hence, where there is discrimination 
(seer and seen divided), the seen is at the same time seer, but that seer is 
negated in the seen; the nondifference of seen and seer is not mere 
identity, but possesses a self-contradictory structure of mutual nega­
tion simultaneous with identity. In the same way, the seer that occurs 
in discriminative thought and perception also stands in an identity with 
the seen that is characterized by self-contradiction. Therefore, when 
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“subjectivity that has appeared as form” is the seen, the seer is negated 
and, at the same time, is identical with the seen; here, things are known 
from within, through subjectivity becoming them. Further, when sub­
jectivity as form is established in the standpoint of the seer, the seen is 
negated and, at the same time, is identical with the seer; here, subjec­
tivity knows itself without objectifying itself.
The first aspect—subjectivity knowing things by becoming them—is 
expressed by Suzuki as “perception characterized by self-identity that 
arises from within form itself.” “Self-identity” denotes the state of 
“subject and object not yet divided,” in which the subject has become 
one with things. That this seeing “arises from within form itself” 
means that “subject and object not yet divided” is established in 
things. Things are seen through the perception at work in this “subject 
and object not yet divided” or “self-identity.”
In the second aspect—subjectivity knowing itself without objectify­
ing itself—this same perception functioning where “subject and object 
are not yet divided” is further established in the standpoint of the sub­
ject; hence, subjectivity knows itself directly, without objectifying 
itself and without any mediation. Suzuki’s expression, “self-realiza­
tion without any object,” signifies the entirety of both aspects—subjec­
tivity knowing things by becoming them and knowing itself without ob­
jectification—from the side of latter. Without knowing things by 
becoming them, it is impossible for the subjectivity to know itself 
without objectifying itself, just as it is impossible for the finger to point 
to itself. The realization that is self-knowledge without self-objectifica- 
tion is achieved precisely because, at the same time, one knows things 
by becoming them. To know things by becoming them is none other 
than to know oneself without objectifying oneself. Hence, as Nishitani 
Keiji states, “The stance of being submerged (maibotsu) in things is the 
stance of self-realization.”10 There is only subjectivity without any ob­
ject, and since this subjectivity submerges itself in a thing (form)— 
becomes empty and the same as no-subjectivity—it is seen as form.
10 Kono eien naru mono, with Yoshikawa KOjird (Kyoto, 1967), p. 198. This con­
cept is also expressed in the Zen phrase, “No-thing in mind, no-mind in things.” “No­
thing in mind” corresponds to subjectivity only with no object; “no-mind in things” is 
subjectivity as no-subjectivity, appearing as form. It is the mutual conformity of these 
two opposing aspects that is true reality. Sec Ueda Shizuteru, Zen bukkyO (Tokyo, 
1973), pp. 38-40.
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In “subjectivity appearing as form” in this way, knowing things and 
knowing oneself are both established freely and without hindrance, 
and the bodhisattva carries on a life characterized by both.
Thus we find that the basic structure of prajfia as set forth by Suzuki 
matches that of nondiscriminative wisdom taught in Indian Buddhism. 
Here, we can draw two conclusions. First, although Zen is often 
asserted to be a highly specialized offshoot of Buddhism, developed 
under the influence of Chinese thought and culture, at its roots it draws 
upon the central current of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Second, we 
see that Suzuki’s explanation of Zen is not an exclusively personal and 
idiosyncratic view, but an exposition that articulates the character of 
Zen at its fundamental level.
Form is Emptiness, Emptiness is Form
Nagarjuna asserts that “the reality of all things” is synonymous 
both with emptiness and with wisdom. In other words, in it object and 
wisdom are nondual. On the side of wisdom, it is prajfiaparamita; on 
the side of object, it is emptiness, suchness, formlessness, dharma­
realm, and pa ramart ha (object of supreme wisdom). In that it is 
“wisdom that has attained the other shore” (prajnQparamitO), it is 
highest perfect enlightenment. That emptiness and prajfiaparamita are 
two faces of the same reality is expressed in Asanga and Vasubandhu 
as the nonduality of suchness and nondiscriminative wisdom, and as 
“seen and seer are same, same.”
Since the prajfiaparamita discussed in the preceding section forms 
the basis of Nagarjuna’s thought, its structure of simultaneous identity 
and mutual negation should be manifest in his concepts of emptiness 
and co-dependent origination. These have both ontological and 
epistemological aspects. The ontological aspect is expressed “form is 
emptiness, emptiness is form.” “Form” is a thing with color and 
shape; it can be grasped by perception and is one part of existence. 
“Emptiness” means that there is nothing. “Is” indicates the identity 
or nondifference of form (existence) and emptiness (nonexistence), and 
thus clearly involves a self-contradiction. In a purely philological 
methodology, however, self-contradiction is unacceptable. In order to 
avoid self-contradiction, Ui asserts that what is negated by the term 
emptiness is not form itself, but rather form that is conceived as “ex­
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isting independently” and not as “existing together with other things 
in mutual interrelation and interdependence.” Further, the “form” 
whose existence is affirmed in “emptiness is form” is also not the form 
itself, but form “that exists together with other things in mutual inter­
relation and interdependence.” Here, “form” is understood to have 
two different meanings: 1) form that exists and stands in a relation of 
mutual interdependence with other things, and 2) form that is concep­
tualized as independent and not interrelated, but that does not really ex­
ist. Since what is affirmed and what is negated are not the same, the 
original self-contradiction is dissolved.
Suzuki, however, states:
Where the finite form merges into the infinite that is emp­
tiness, at the same time emptiness reflects itself in the finite 
form. Here, the unmediated perception that is satori becomes 
possible. (TOyO no kokoro, p. 94)
Suzuki makes no distinction in the meaning of “form”; it is always the 
identical form. One form—with a certain coloration and shape—com­
pletely melts and merges into the vast and unlimited nothingness and 
becomes the infinite void. Thus, form becomes one with emptiness. At 
the same time, infinite emptiness takes the limitedness of form and 
becomes manifest; here, emptiness becomes form. In this way, a self­
contradictory relation in which form and emptiness, existence and 
nothingness, finite and infinite are one and at the same time different is 
established.
Comparing the understandings of Ui and Suzuki outlined above, we 
find that Ui’s can be easily grasped, but Suzuki’s presents a number of 
difficulties. What does it mean that the limited form melts and merges 
into the infinite? Provisionally, we can take this to describe a mystical 
experience in which form enters into the formless and becomes one 
with it. But then what are we to make of the reverse, where indeter­
minate formlessness reflects itself in finite form? How is it possible for 
the infinite to enter the finite? Does “reflect” mean that the infinite 
transfers its own reflection into the finite? If so, since it has then 
become finite, is it not impossible to speak of the infinite itself? 
“Reflect” implies something that sees, but is it the infinite, or 
something else? None of these questions are answered. Probably a 
good number of Suzuki’s readers have felt that his explanation ex-
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presses a special understanding that cannot be grasped without the ex­
perience of Zen. Further, many may assume that the emptiness of 
general Mahayana thought taught in the Prajfiaparamita Sfitras should 
instead be understood as Ui does. The general inclination among Bud­
dhist scholars—though with many variations—is to follow an 
understanding like Ui’s. In my opinion, however, it is Suzuki’s inter­
pretation that clarifies emptiness.
Emptiness is taught in the Prajfiaparamita Sutras, whose central 
theme is the practice of prajfiaparamita, that is, how the bodhisattva 
should perform prajfiaparamita. In other words, prajfiaparamita is at 
the same time wisdom and practice. The Heart SQtra begins, “When 
AvalokiteSvara Bodhisattva was deeply practicing prajfiaparamita, he 
clearly saw that the five aggregates were all empty. . . It goes on, 
“Form is itself emptiness, emptiness is form.’’ This emptiness is the 
content of the practice of prajfiaparamita.
The other Prajfiaparamita Sutras are similar. That “all things are 
empty” or “ungraspable” is taught in relation to the contemplative 
practice of bodhisattvas. Edward Conze, in the introduction to his 
translation, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, 
speaks of the great repetitiveness of the sutra as though it were a 
stylistic failing. In fact, the sutra is not a treatise meant to develop doc­
trine or thought but rather was written to give guidance in practice, and 
practice is repetitive performance (bhdvanO). Chi-tsang (549-623) 
termed the emptiness of the San-lun “emptiness-contemplation,” for 
emptiness is inseparable from the contemplative practice called pra- 
jfi&p&ramita.
We see, then, that emptiness in the Prajfiaparamita SOtras is in­
separable from practice. When we review Ui’s interpretation with this 
in mind, unacceptable features come to light, for he gives inadequate at­
tention to the practice of prajaparamita. He states:
Emptiness indicates the ungraspability of the definite 
substance of things that unenlightened beings and those of 
other teachings consider real, and of the everlasting, existent 
dharma-substance that followers of Hlnayfina Buddhism 
speak of. It is, in other words, the absence of a self-nature as 
real substance. (Indotetsugakushi, p. 271)
As we have seen, that “form is empty . . . sensation, thought, feeling,
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and consciousness are empty" is taught in relation to how the 
bodhisattva should view the five aggregates when performing pra- 
jfiap&ramita. Thus, it refers to the emptiness of form seen by the 
bodhisattva. If the form negated by emptiness in the statement "form 
is empty" is the form seen by the bodhisattva in the practice of pra- 
jfiaparamita, then clearly the form affirmed in the reverse expression, 
"emptiness is form, emptiness is sensation, thought, feeling, con­
sciousness," also refers to the form seen by the bodhisattva in practice. 
Emptiness-contemplation holds a logical structure in which form is 
both negated and affirmed; this is precisely expressed in Suzuki’s 
words, "Where the finite form merges into the infinite that is emp­
tiness, at the same time emptiness reflects itself in the finite form."
According to Ui’s interpretation, unenlightened people and 
followers of other teachings or of Hinayana Buddhism see things as 
possessing a definite substance or as an everlasting dharma-substance. 
The Mahayana bodhisattva does not see form as real substance, but 
rather as "being mutually interrelated with all other things and existing 
as itself for the first time on the basis of this relationship." This mode 
of existence implies, according to Ui, that things are characterized by 
co-dependent origination. That form is emptiness and that form is co­
dependent origination are completely identical in meaning. Thus, what 
is negated by the word emptiness, which means "There is no . . .," is 
the form that is not co-dependent origination, that is, the form 
conceived as having real substance. It is the form seen by the 
unenlightened and followers of other teachings or Hmaydna, who have 
nothing to do with the practice of prajfiaparamita, not the form seen 
by bodhisattvas. Earlier I remarked that Ui grasps the "form" in 
"form is emptiness, emptiness is form," which originally has a self-con- 
tradictory structure, as two kinds of form—negated and affirmed—and 
in this way dissolves the original contradiction. As we see here, the 
negated form and the affirmed form are seen by completely different 
persons. Moreover, whether form is taken as co-dependent origination 
or as conceptualized substance, this understanding of emptiness can­
not produce an plausible interpretation of the entire expression "form 
is emptiness, emptiness is form." If form is co-dependent origination, 
it is not negated by emptiness; hence, even when "form is emptiness" 
is reversed as "emptiness is form," no new meaning emerges. If "form 
is emptiness" is taken to mean that form as substance is emptied and 
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abandoned, it is not without meaning, but the reverse, “emptiness is 
form,” becomes completely meaningless. In this case, emptiness in­
dicates the negation of form as real substance and not the emptiness as 
co-dependent origination; hence, it is impossible to go from emptiness 
to form.
By contrast, Suzuki’s interpretation well expresses the structure of 
nondiscriminative wisdom or prajndparamita. That the finite and 
limited form fuses and merges into the infinite emptiness means that in 
the practice of prajflapdramita, the form seen by false discrimination is 
eradicated (false discrimination comes not to discriminate form) and 
becomes nondiscriminative wisdom or true prajnap&ramita (wisdom 
that has attained the other shore). This is no-mind, or the eradication 
of both object and subjectivity, or “all things are empty” (object and 
wisdom both empty). At the same time, however, in this non­
discriminative wisdom (no-mind), discrimination (seeing, hearing, 
perceiving, knowing) functions; hence, it sees form. That emptiness 
reflects itself in the finite form means that this nondiscriminative pra- 
jna, in which both object and wisdom are empty, sees form through its 
discrimination of nondiscrimination (mind of no-mind); hence the 
word “reflect.” Further, emptiness reflects itself because emptiness is 
suchness or dharma-realm, characterized by the nonduality of object 
and wisdom. Thus, the form seen by the mind of no-mind is identical 
with the mind that sees it. Here, both mind and object are none other 
than emptiness, that is, suchness or dharma-realm; hence, for the see­
ing mind, the object seen is itself. “Discrimination of nondiscrimina­
tion” and “form is emptiness, emptiness is form” share the identical 
self-contradictory structure and are two aspects of the same reality. 
The former expresses the side of mind or wisdom, and the latter, the 
side of the seen object.
Conclusion
What is seen by prajna or known by nondiscriminative wisdom— 
whether called thusness (tathatO) or emptiness or subjectivity-only—is 
fundamentally inexpressible in words, and yet somehow expressed. 
Here, self-contradictory verbal structures are unavoidable. If this is the 
case, unless we devise ways by which we can accept those words as they 
are with their self-contradictions, we will not be able to grasp 
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accurately the world of religious experience that Buddhist texts seek to 
transmit to us and will fall into misunderstandings. Suzuki was able, 
through Zen, to penetrate to the depths of Mahayana Buddhism. Con­
cerning his understanding of the Heart Satra, he states:
The Heart SQtra should not be approached through the in­
tellect, though at first it may appear to suggest that. It should 
be approached by following the lines of religious experience. 
(HannyakyO no tetsugaku to shttkyO, p. 144)
The religious experience mentioned here is, of course, not limited to 
Zen. Suzuki had a great interest in the myOkOnin—“wondrous, ex­
cellent people”—of Shin Buddhism and sought to depict their inner 
lives, for he saw that the world they attained through the nembutsu and 
that which he had reached through Zen were fundamentally one. 
Following the lines of religious experience is surely not limited to the 
areas to which Suzuki directed his attention. Future scholarship in Bud­
dhism must awaken to the necessity of devising such paths and direct 
efforts in this direction.
Translated by Dennis Hirota
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